Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London (Science B) Send correspondence to: by Joshua Greene et al.
1
For the Law, Neuroscience Changes Nothing and Everything
Joshua Greene and Jonathan Cohen
Department of Psychology
Center for the Study of Brain, Mind, and Behavior
Princeton University
In press at
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London (Science B)
Send correspondence to:
Joshua Greene
Department of Psychology
Princeton University2
Princeton, NJ 08544
jdgreene@princeton.edu3
Summary
The rapidly growing field of cognitive neuroscience holds the promise of
explaining the operations of the mind in terms of the physical operations of the
brain.  Some suggest that our emerging understanding of the physical causes of
human (mis)behaviour will have a transformative effect on the law.  Others argue
that new neuroscience will provide only new details and that existing legal
doctrine can accommodate whatever new information neuroscience will provide.
We argue that neuroscience will likely have a transformative effect on the law
despite the fact that existing legal doctrine can, in principle, accommodate
whatever neuroscience will tell us.  New neuroscience will change the law, not by
undermining its current assumptions, but by transforming people’s moral
intuitions regarding free will and responsibility.  This change in moral outlook will
result not from the discovery of crucial new facts or clever new arguments, but
from a new appreciation of old arguments, bolstered by vivid new illustrations
provided by cognitive neuroscience.  We foresee, and recommend, a shift away
from punishment aimed at retribution in favor of a more progressive,
consequentialist approach to the criminal law.
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The law takes a longstanding interest in the mind.  In most criminal cases, a
successful conviction requires the prosecution to establish not only that the
defendant engaged in proscribed behaviour, but also that the misdeed in
question was the product of mens rea, a “guilty mind.”  Narrowly interpreted,
mens rea refers to the intention to commit a criminal act, but the term has a
looser interpretation by which it refers to all mental states consistent with moral
and/or legal blame.  (A killing motivated by insane delusional beliefs may meet
the requirements for mens rea in the first sense, but not the second.) (Goldstein
et al., 2003) Thus, for centuries, many legal issues have turned on the question:
“What was he thinking?”
 To answer this question, the law has often turned to science.  Today, the
newest kid on this particular scientific block is cognitive neuroscience, the study
of the mind via the brain, which has gained prominence in part due to the advent
of functional neuroimaging as a widely used tool for psychological research.
Given the law’s aforementioned concern for mental states, along with its
preference for “hard” evidence, it’s no surprise that interest in the potential legal
implications of cognitive neuroscience abounds.  But does our emerging
understanding of the mind as brain really have any deep implications for the law?
This special issue is a testament to the thought that it might.  Some have argued,
however, that new neuroscience contributes nothing more than new details and
that existing legal principles can handle anything that neuroscience will throw our
way in the foreseeable future (Morse, in press).5
In our view, both of these positions are, in their respective ways, correct.
Existing legal principles make virtually no assumptions about the neural bases of
criminal behaviour, and as a result they can comfortably assimilate new
neuroscience without much in the way of conceptual upheaval—new details, new
sources of evidence, but nothing for which the law is fundamentally unprepared.
We maintain, however, that our operative legal principles exist because they
more or less adequately capture an intuitive sense of justice.  In our view,
neuroscience will challenge and ultimately reshape our intuitive sense(s) of
justice.  New neuroscience will affect the way we view the law, not by furnishing
us with new ideas or arguments about the nature of human action, but by
breathing new life into old ones.  Cognitive neuroscience, by identifying the
specific mechanisms responsible for behaviour, will vividly illustrate what until
now could only be appreciated through esoteric theorizing: that there is
something fishy about our ordinary conceptions of human action and
responsibility, and that, as a result, the legal principles we’ve devised to reflect
these conceptions may be flawed.
Our argument runs as follows:  First, we draw a familiar distinction
between the consequentialist justification for state punishment, according to
which punishment is merely an instrument for promoting future social welfare,
and the retributivist justification for punishment, according to which the principal
aim of punishment is to give people what they deserve based on their past
actions.  We observe that the commonsense approach to moral and legal6
responsibility has consequentialist elements, but is largely retributivist.  Unlike
the consequentialist justification for punishment, the retributivist justification
relies, either explicitly or implicitly, on a demanding—and some say overly
demanding—conception of free will.   We therefore consider the standard
responses to the philosophical problem of free will (Watson, 1982).  “Libertarians”
(no relation to the political philosophy) and “hard determinists” agree on
“incompatibilism,” the thesis that free will and determinism are incompatible, but
they disagree about whether determinism is true, or near enough true to preclude
free will.  Libertarians believe that we have free will because determinism is false,
and hard determinists believe that we lack free will because determinism is
(approximately) true.  “Compatibilists,” in contrast to both libertarians and hard
determinists, argue that free will and determinism are perfectly compatible.
We argue that current legal doctrine, while officially compatibilist, is
ultimately grounded in intuitions that are incompatibilist and, more specifically,
libertarian.  In other words, the law says that it presupposes nothing more than a
metaphysically modest notion of free will that is perfectly compatible with
determinism.  However, we argue that the law’s intuitive support is ultimately
grounded in a metaphysically overambitious, libertarian notion of free will that is
threatened by determinism and, more pointedly, by forthcoming cognitive
neuroscience.  At present, the gap between what the law officially cares about
and what people really care about is only revealed occasionally when vivid
scientific information about the causes of criminal behavior leads people to doubt7
certain individuals’ capacity for moral and legal responsibility, despite the fact
that this information is irrelevant according to the law’s stated principles.  We
argue that new neuroscience will continue to highlight and widen this gap.  That
is, new neuroscience will undermine people’s commonsense, libertarian
conception of free will and the retributivist thinking that depends on it, both of
which have heretofore been shielded by the inaccessibility of sophisticated
thinking about the mind and its neural basis.
The net effect of this influx of scientific information will be a rejection of
free will as it is ordinarily conceived, with important ramifications for the law.  As
noted above, our criminal justice system is largely retributivist.  We argue that
retributivism, despite its unstable marriage to compatibilist philosophy in the letter
of the law, ultimately depends on an intuitive, libertarian notion of free will that is
undermined by science.  Therefore, with the rejection of commonsense
conceptions of free will comes the rejection of retributivism and an ensuing shift
toward a consequentialist approach to punishment, i.e. one aimed at promoting
future welfare rather than meting out just deserts.  Because consequentialist
approaches to punishment remain viable in the absence of commonsense free
will, we need not give up on moral and legal responsibility.  We argue further that
the philosophical problem of free will arises out of a conflict between two
cognitive subsystems that speak different “languages”:  the “folk psychology”
system and the “folk physics” system.  Because we are inherently of two minds
when it comes to the problem of free will, this problem will never find an intuitively8
satisfying solution.  We can, however, recognize that free will, as conceptualized
by the folk psychology system, is an illusion and structure our society accordingly
by rejecting retributivist legal principles that derive their intuitive force from this
illusion.
1. Two theories of punishment: consequentialism and retributivism
There are two standard justifications for legal punishment (Lacey, 1988).
According to the forward-looking, consequentialist theory, which emerges from
the classical utilitarian tradition (Bentham, 1982), punishment is justified by its
future beneficial effects.  Chief among them are the prevention of future crime
through the deterrent effect of the law and the containment of dangerous
individuals.  Few would deny that the deterrence of future crime and the
protection of the public are legitimate justifications for punishment.  The
controversy surrounding consequentialist theories concerns their serviceability as
complete normative theories of punishment.  Most theorists find them inadequate
in this regard (e.g. (Hart, 1968)), and many argue that consequentialism
fundamentally mischaracterizes the primary justification for punishment, which,
these critics argue, is retribution (Kant, 2002).  As a result, they claim,
consequentialist theories justify intuitively unfair forms of punishment, if not in
practice then in principle.  One problem is that of Draconian penalties.  It’s9
possible, for example, that imposing the death penalty for parking violations
would maximize aggregate welfare by reducing parking violations to near zero.
But, retributivists claim, whether or not this is a good idea does not depend on
the balance of costs and benefits.  It’s simply wrong to kill someone for double
parking.  A related problem is that of punishing the innocent.  It’s possible that,
under certain circumstances, falsely convicting an innocent person would have a
salutary deterrent effect, enough to justify that person’s suffering, etc.  Critics
also note that, so far as deterrence is concerned, it is the threat of punishment
that is justified and not the punishment itself.  Thus, consequentialism might
justify letting murderers and rapists off the hook so long as their punishment
could be convincingly faked.
The standard consequentialist response to these charges is that such
concerns have no place in the real world.  They say, for example, that the idea of
imposing the death penalty for parking violations in order to make society an
overall happier place is absurd.  People everywhere would live in mortal fear of
bureaucratic errors, and so on.   Likewise, a legal system that deliberately
convicted innocent people and/or secretly refrained from punishing guilty ones
would require a kind of systematic deception that would lead inevitably to
corruption and that could never survive in a free society.  At this point critics
retort that consequentialist theories, at best, get the right answers for the wrong
reasons.  It’s wrong to punish innocent people, etc., because it’s fundamentally
unfair, not because it leads to bad consequences in practice.  Such critics are10
certainly correct to point out that consequentialist theories fail to capture
something central to commonsense intuitions about legitimate punishment.
The backward-looking, retributivist account does a better job of capturing
these intuitions.  Its fundamental principle is simple:  In the absence of mitigating
circumstances, people who engage in criminal behaviour deserve to be
punished, and that is why we punish them.  Some would explicate this theory in
terms of criminals’ forfeiting rights, others in terms of the rights of the victimized,
while others would appeal to the violation of a hypothetical social contract, and
so on.  Retributivist theories come in many flavors, but these distinctions need
not concern us here.  What is important for our purposes is that retributivism
captures the intuitive idea that we legitimately punish in order to give people what
they deserve based on their past actions—in proportion to their “internal
wickedness,” to use Kant’s phrase (Kant, 2002)—and not, primarily, to promote
social welfare in the future.
The retributivist perspective is widespread, both in the explicit views of
legal theorists and implicitly in common sense.  There are two primary
motivations for questioning retributivist theory.  The first, which will not concern
us here, comes from a prior commitment to a broader consequentialist moral
theory.  The second comes from skepticism regarding the notion of desert,
grounded in a broader skepticism about the possibility of free will in a
deterministic or mechanistic world.11
2. Free will and retributivism
The problem of free will is old and has many formulations (Watson, 1982).
Here’s one, drawing on a more detailed and exacting formulation by Peter Van
Inwagen (Van Inwagen, 1982):  Determinism is true if the world is such that its
current state is completely determined by (a) the laws of physics and (b) past
states of the world.  Intuitively, the idea is that a deterministic universe starts
however it starts and then ticks along like clockwork from there.  Given a set of
prior conditions in the universe and a set of physical laws that completely govern
the way the universe evolves, there is only one way that things can actually
proceed.
Free will, it is often said, requires the ability do otherwise (an assumption
that has been questioned (Frankfurt, 1966)).  One can’t say, for example, that I
have freely chosen soup over salad if forces beyond my control are sufficient to
necessitate my choosing soup.  But, the determinist argues, this is precisely what
forces beyond your control do—always.  You have no say whatsoever in the
state of the universe before your birth; nor do you have any say about the laws of
physics.  And yet, if determinism is true, these two things together are sufficient
to determine your choice of soup over salad.  Thus, some say, if determinism is
true, your sense of yourself and others as having free will is an illusion.12
There are three standard responses to the problem of free will.  The first,
known as “hard determinism,” accepts the incompatibility of free will and
determinism (“incompatibilism”), and asserts determinism, thus rejecting free will.
The second response is libertarianism (again, no relation to the political
philosophy), which accepts incompatibilism, but denies that determinism is true.
This may seem like a promising approach.  After all, hasn’t modern physics
shown us that the universe is indeterministic (Hughs, 1992)?  The problem here
is that the sort of indeterminism afforded by modern physics is not the sort the
libertarian needs or desires.  If it turns out that your ordering soup is completely
determined by the laws of physics, the state of the universe 10,000 years ago,
and the outcomes of myriad subatomic coin flips, your appetizer is no more freely
chosen than before.  Indeed, it’s randomly chosen, which is no help to the
libertarian.  What about some other kind of indeterminism?  What if, somewhere
deep in the brain, there are mysterious events that operate independently of the
ordinary laws of physics and that are somehow tied to the will of the brain’s
owner?  In light of the available evidence, this is highly unlikely.  Say what you
will about the “hard problem” of consciousness (Shear, 1999), there is not a
shred of scientific evidence to support the existence of causally effective
processes in the mind/brain that violate the laws of physics.  In our opinion, any
scientifically respectable discussion of free will requires the rejection of what
Strawson (Strawson, 1962) famously called the  “panicky metaphysics” of
libertarianism.
1
                                                   
1 Of course, scientific respectability is not everyone’s first priority.  However, the law in most13
Finally, we come to the dominant view among philosophers and legal
theorists: compatibilism.  Compatibilists concede that some notions of free will
may require indefensible, panicky metaphysics, but maintain that the kinds of
free will “worth wanting,” to use Dennett’s (Dennett, 1984) phrase, are perfectly
compatible with determinism.  Compatibilist theories vary, but all compatibilists
agree that free will is a perfectly natural, scientifically respectable phenomenon
and part of the ordinary human condition.  They also agree that free will can be
undermined by various kinds of psychological deficit, e.g. mental illness or
“infancy.”  Thus, according to this view, a freely willed action is one that is made
via the right sort of psychology—rational, free of delusion, etc.
Compatibilists make some compelling arguments.  After all, isn’t it obvious
that we have free will?  Could science plausibly deny the obvious fact that I am
free to raise my hand at will?  For many people, such simple observations make
the reality of free will non-negotiable.  But at the same time, many such people
concede that determinism, or something like it, is a live possibility.  And if free will
is obviously real, but determinism is debatable, then the reality of free will must
not hinge on the rejection of determinism.  That is, free will and determinism must
be compatible.  Many compatibilists skeptically ask what would it mean to give up
on free will.  Were we to give it up, wouldn’t we have to immediately reinvent it?
                                                                                                                                                          
Western states is a public institution designed to function in a society that respects a wide range
of religious and otherwise metaphysical beliefs.  The law cannot function in this way if it
presupposes controversial and unverifiable metaphysical facts about the nature of human action,
or anything else.  Thus, the law must restrict itself to the class of intersubjectively verifiable facts,
i.e. the facts recognized by science, broadly construed.  This practice need not derive from a
conviction that the scientifically verifiable facts are necessarily the only facts, but merely from a
recognition that verifiable/scientific facts are the only facts upon which public institutions in a
pluralistic society can effectively rely.14
Doesn’t every decision involve an implicit commitment to the idea of free will?
And how else would we distinguish between ordinary rational adults and other
individuals, such as young children and the mentally ill, whose will—or whatever
you want to call it—is clearly compromised?  Free will, compatibilsts argue, is
here to stay, and the challenge for science is to figure out how exactly it works
and not to peddle silly arguments that deny the undeniable (Dennett, 2003).
The forward-looking/consequentialist approach to punishment works with
all three responses to the problem of free will, including hard determinism.  This
is because consequentialists are not concerned with whether anyone is really
innocent or guilty in some ultimate sense that might depend on people’s having
free will, but only with the likely effects of punishment.  (Of course, one might
wonder what it means for a hard determinist to justify any sort of choice.  We will
return to this issue in Section 7.)    The retributivist approach, in contrast, is
plausibly regarded as requiring free will and the rejection of hard determinism.
Retributivists want to know whether the defendant truly deserves to be punished.
Assuming one can deserve to be punished only for actions that are freely willed,
hard determinism implies that no one really deserves to be punished.  Thus, hard
determinism combined with retributivism requires the elimination of all
punishment, which does not seem reasonable.  This leaves retributivists with two
options: compatibilism and libertarianism.  Libertarianism, for reasons given
above, and in spite of its intuitive appeal, is scientifically suspect.  At the very
least, the law shouldn’t depend on it.  It seems, then, that retributivism requires15
compatibilism.  Accordingly, the standard legal account of punishment is
compatibilist.
3. Neuroscience changes nothing
The title of a recent paper by Stephen Morse, “New Neuroscience, Old
Problems,” (in press) aptly summarizes many a seasoned legal thinker’s
response to the suggestion that brain research will revolutionize the law.  The law
has been dealing with issues of criminal responsibility for a long time, Morse
argues, and there is nothing on the neuroscientific horizon that it can’t handle.
The reason the law is immune to such threats is that it makes no
assumptions that neuroscience, or any science, is likely to challenge.  The law
assumes that people have a general capacity for rational choice.  That is, people
have beliefs and desires and are capable of producing behaviour that serves
their desires in light of their beliefs.  The law acknowledges that our capacity for
rational choice is far from perfect (Kahneman and Tversky, 2000), requiring only
that the people it deems legally responsible have a general capacity for rational
behaviour.
Thus, questions about who is or is not responsible in the eyes of the law
have and will continue to turn on questions about rationality.  This approach was
first codified in the M’Naghten standard according to which a defense on the16
ground of insanity requires proof that the defendant labored under “a defect of
reason, from disease of the mind” (Goldstein, 1967).    Not all standards
developed and applied since M’Naghten explicitly mention the need to
demonstrate the defendant’s diminished rationality (e.g. the Durham standard
(Goldstein, 1967)), but it is generally agreed that a legal excuse requires a
demonstration that the defendant “lacked a general capacity for rationality”
(Goldstein et al., 2003).  Thus, the argument goes, new science can help us
figure out who was or was not rational at the scene of the crime, much as it has
in the past, but new science will not justify any fundamental change in the law’s
approach to responsibility unless it shows that people in general fail to meet the
law’s very minimal requirements for rationality.  Science shows no sign of doing
this, and thus the basic precepts of legal responsibility stand firm.  As for
neuroscience more specifically, this discipline seems especially unlikely to
undermine our faith in general minimal rationality.  If any sciences have an
outside chance of demonstrating that our behaviour is thoroughly irrational or
arational it’s the ones that study behaviour directly rather than its proximate
physical causes in the brain.  The law, this argument continues, doesn’t care if
people have “free will” in any deep metaphysical sense that might be threatened
by determinism.  It only cares that people in general are minimally rational.  So
long as this appears to be the case, it can go on regarding people as free
(compatibilism) and holding ordinary people responsible for their misdeeds while17
making exceptions for those who fail to meet the requirements of general
rationality.
In light of this, one might wonder what all the fuss is about.  If the law
assumes nothing more than general minimal rationality, and neuroscience does
nothing to undermine this assumption, then why would anyone even think that
neuroscience poses some sort of threat to legal doctrines of criminal
responsibility?  It sounds like this is just a simple mistake, and that is precisely
what Morse contends.  He calls this mistake “the fundamental psycholegal error”
which is “to believe that causation, especially abnormal causation, is per se an
excusing condition.” (Morse, in press)  In other words, if you think that
neuroscientific information about the causes of human action, or some particular
human’s action, can, by itself, make for a legitimate legal excuse, you just don’t
understand the law.  Every action is caused by brain events, and describing
those events and affirming their causal efficacy is of no legal interest in and of
itself.  Morse continues, “[The psycholegal error] leads people to try to create a
new excuse every time an allegedly valid new ‘syndrome’ is discovered that is
thought to play a role in behaviour.  But syndromes and other causes do not
have excusing force unless they sufficiently diminish rationality in the context in
question.”
In our opinion, Morse and like-minded theorists are absolutely correct
about the relationship between current legal doctrine and any forthcoming
neuroscientific results.  For the law, as written, neuroscience changes nothing.18
The law provides a coherent framework for the assessment of criminal
responsibility that is not threatened by anything neuroscience is likely to throw at
it.  But, we maintain, the law nevertheless stands on shakier ground than the
foregoing would suggest.  The legitimacy of the law itself depends on its
adequately reflecting the moral intuitions and commitments of society.  If
neuroscience can change those intuitions, then neuroscience can change the
law.
As it happens, this is a possibility that Morse explicitly acknowledges.
However, he believes that such developments would require radical new ideas
that we can scarcely imagine at this time, e.g. a new solution to the mind-body
problem.  We disagree.  The seeds of discontent are already sown in
commonsense legal thought.  In our opinion, the “fundamental psycholegal error”
is not so much an error as a reflection of the gap between what the law officially
cares about and what people really care about.  In modern criminal law, there’s
been a long, tense marriage of convenience between compatibilist legal
principles and libertarian moral intuitions.  New neuroscience, we argue, will
likely render this marriage unworkable.
4. What really matters for responsibility?:  materialist theory, dualist
intuitions, and the “Boys from Brazil” problem19
According to the law, the central question in a case of putative diminished
responsibility is whether the accused was sufficiently rational at the time of the
misdeed in question.  We believe, however, that this is not what most people
really care about, and that for them diminished rationality is just a presumed
correlate of something deeper. It seems that what many people really want to
know is:  Was it really him?  This question usually comes in the form of a
disjunction, depending on how the excuse is constructed:  Was it him, or was it
his upbringing ?  Was it him, or was it his genes?  Was it him, or was it his
circumstances? Was it him, or was it his brain?  But what most people do not
understand, despite the fact that naturalistic philosophers and scientists have
been saying it for centuries, is that there is no “him” independent of these other
things.  (Or, to be a bit more accommodating to the supernaturally inclined, there
is no “him” independent of these things that shows any sign of affecting anything
in the physical world, including his behavior.)
Most people’s view of the mind is implicitly dualist and libertarian and not
materialist and compatibilist.  Dualism, for our purposes, is the view that mind
and brain are separate, interacting, entities.
2  Dualism fits naturally with
                                                   
2 There are some forms of dualism according to which the mind and body, while distinct, do not
interact, making it impossible for the mind to have any observable effects on the brain or anything
else in the physical world.  These versions of dualism do not concern us here. For the purposes
of this paper, we are happy to allow the metaphysical claim that souls or aspects of minds may
exist independently of the physical body.  Our concern is specifically with interactionist versions of
dualism according to which non-physical mental entities have observable physical effects.  We
believe that science has rendered such views untenable and that the law, insofar as it is a public
institution designed to serve a pluralistic society, must not rely on beliefs that are scientifically
suspect.  (See previous footnote.)20
libertarianism because a mind distinct from the body is precisely the sort of non-
physical source of free will that libertarianism requires.  Materialism, in contrast,
is the view that all events, including the operations of the mind, are ultimately
operations of matter that obeys the laws of physics.  It’s hard to imagine a belief
in free will that is materialist but not compatibilist given that ordinary matter does
not seem capable of supplying the non-physical processes that libertarianism
requires.
  Many people, particularly those who are religious, are explicitly dualist
libertarians (again, not in the political sense).  However, in our estimation, even
people who do or would readily endorse a thoroughly material account of human
action and its causes have dualist, libertarian intuitions.  This goes not only for
educated people in general, but for experts in mental health and criminal
behaviour.  Consider, for example, the following remarks from Jonathan Pincus,
an expert on criminal behaviour and the brain:
When a composer conceives a symphony, the only way he or she can
present it to the public is through an orchestra… If the performance is
poor, the fault could lie with the composer’s conception, or the orchestra,
or both…  Will is expressed by the brain.  Violence can be the result of
volition only, but if a brain is damaged, brain failure must be at least partly
to blame (Pincus, 2001).21
To our untutored intuitions, this is a perfectly sensible analogy, but it is ultimately
grounded in a kind of dualism that is scientifically untenable.  It’s not as if there’s
you, the composer, and then your brain, the orchestra.  You are your brain, and
your brain is the composer and the orchestra all rolled together.  There is no little
man, no “homunculus,” in the brain that is the real you behind the mass of
neuronal instrumentation.  Scientifically minded philosophers have been saying
this ad nauseum (Dennett, 1991), and we won’t belabor the point.  Moreover, we
suspect that if you were to ask Dr. Pincus whether he thinks there is a little
conductor directing his brain’s activity from within or beyond he would adamantly
deny that this is the case.  At the same time, though, he is comfortable
comparing a brain-damaged criminal to a healthy conductor saddled with an
unhealthy orchestra.   This sort of doublethink is not uncommon.  As we will
argue in Section 6, when it comes to moral responsibility in a physical world, we
are all of two minds.
A recent article by Laurence Steinberg and Elizabeth Scott (Steinberg and
Scott, 2003), experts respectively on adolescent developmental psychology and
juvenile law, illustrates the same point.  Steinberg and Scott argue that
adolescents do not meet the law’s general requirements for rationality and that
therefore they should be considered less than fully responsible for their actions
and, more specifically, unsuitable candidates for the death penalty.  Their main
argument is sound, but they can’t resist embellishing it with a bit of superfluous
neuroscience:22
Most of the developmental research on cognitive and psychosocial
functioning in adolescence measures behaviors, self-perceptions, or
attitudes, but mounting evidence suggests that at least some of the
differences between adults and adolescents have neuropsychological and
neurobiological underpinnings (Pg. 5)
Some of the differences?  Unless some form of dualism is correct, every mental
difference and every difference in behavioural tendency is a function of some
kind of difference in the brain.  But here it is implicitly suggested that things like
“behaviors, self-perceptions, or attitudes” may be grounded in something other
than the brain.  In summing up their case, Steinberg and Scott look toward the
future:
Especially needed are studies that link developmental changes in decision
making to changes in brain structure and function…  In our view, however,
there is sufficient indirect suggestive evidence of age differences in
capacities that are relevant to criminal blameworthiness to support the
position that youths who commit crimes should be punished more leniently
then their adult counterparts (Pg. 9).23
This gets the order of evidence backwards.  If what the law ultimately cares
about is whether adolescents can behave rationally, then it is evidence
concerning adolescent behaviour that is directly relevant.  Studying the
adolescent brain is a highly indirect way of figuring out whether adolescents in
general are rational.  Indeed, the only way we neuroscientists can tell if a brain
structure is important for rational judgment is to see if its activity or damage is
correlated with (ir)rational behaviour.
 3
If everyone agrees that what the law ultimately cares about is the capacity
for rational behaviour, then why are Steinberg and Scott so optimistic about
neuroscientific evidence that is only indirectly relevant ?  The reason, we
suggest, is that they are appealing not to a legal argument, but to a moral
intuition.  So far as the law is concerned, information about the physical
processes that give rise to bad behaviour is irrelevant.  But to people who
implicitly believe that real decision-making takes place in the mind, not in the
brain, demonstrating that there is a brain basis for adolescents’ misdeeds allows
us to blame adolescents’ brains instead of the adolescents themselves.
The fact that people are tempted to attach great moral/legal significance to
neuroscientific information that, according to the letter of the law, shouldn’t
matter, suggests that what the law cares about and what people care about do
not necessarily coincide.  To make this point in a more general way, we offer the
                                                   
3 It is conceivable that rationality could someday be redefined in neuro-cognitive rather than
behavioral terms, much as water has been redefined in terms of its chemical composition.  Were
that to happen, neuroscientific evidence could then be construed as more direct than behavioral
evidence.  But Steinberg and Scott’s argument appears to make use of a conventional,
behavioral definition of rationality and not a neuro-cognitive redefinition.24
following thought experiment, which we call “the Boys from Brazil problem.”  It is
an extension of an argument that has made the rounds in philosophical
discussions of free will and responsibility (Rosen, 2002).
In the film The Boys from Brazil, members of the Nazi old guard have
regrouped in South America after the war.  Their plan is to bring their beloved
fuehrer back to life by raising children genetically identical to Hitler (courtesy of
some salvaged DNA) in environments that mimic that of Hitler’s upbringing.  For
example, Hitler’s father died while young Adolph was still a boy, and so each
Hitler clone’s surrogate father is killed at just the right time, and so on, and so
forth.
This is obviously a fantasy, but the idea that one could, in principle,
produce a person with a particular personality and behavioral profile through tight
genetic and environmental control is plausible.  Let us suppose, then, that a
group of scientists has managed to create an individual—call him “Mr.
Puppet”—who, by design, engages in some kind of criminal behaviour, say, a
murder during a drug deal gone bad.  The defense calls to the stand the project’s
lead scientist:  “Please tell us about your relationship to Mr. Puppet…”
It’s very simple, really.  I designed him.  I carefully selected every gene in
his body and carefully scripted every significant event in his life so that he
would become precisely what he is today.  I selected his mother knowing
that she would let him cry for hours and hours before picking him up.  I25
carefully selected each of his relatives, teachers, friends, enemies, etc.
and told them exactly what to say to him and how to treat him.  Things
generally went as planned, but not always.  For example, the angry letters
written to his dead father weren’t supposed to appear until he was
fourteen, but by the end of his thirteenth year he’d already written four of
them.  In retrospect I think this was because of a handful of substitutions I
made to his eighth chromosome.  At any rate, my plans for him
succeeded, as they have for ninety-five percent of the people I’ve
designed.  I assure you that the accused deserves none of the credit.
What to do with Mr. Puppet?  Insofar as we believe this testimony, we’re inclined
to think that Mr. Puppet cannot be held fully responsible for his crimes, if he can
be held responsible for them at all.  He is, perhaps, a man to be feared, and we
wouldn’t want to return him to the streets.  But given the fact that forces beyond
his control played a dominant role in causing him to commit these crimes, it’s
hard to think of him as anything more than a pawn.
But what does the law say about Mr. Puppet?  The law asks whether or
not he was rational at the time of his misdeeds, and as far as we know he was.
For all we know, he is psychologically indistinguishable from the prototypical
guilty criminal, and therefore fully responsible in the eyes of the law.  But,
intuitively, this is not fair.26
Thus, it seems that the law’s exclusive interest in rationality misses
something intuitively important.  In our opinion, rationality is just a presumed
correlate of what most people really care about.  What people really want to
know is if the accused, as opposed to something else, is responsible for the
crime, where that “something else” could be the accused’s brain, genes, or
environment.  The question of someone’s ultimate responsibility seems to turn,
intuitively, on a question of internal vs. external determination.  Mr. Puppet ought
not be held responsible for his actions because forces beyond his control played
a dominant role in the production of his behaviour.  Sure, the scientists didn’t
have complete control—after all, they had a five percent failure rate—but that
doesn’t seem to be enough to restore Mr. Puppet’s free will, at least not entirely.
Yes, he’s as rational as other criminals.  And, yes, it was his desires and beliefs
that produced his actions.  But those beliefs and desires were rigged by external
forces, and that’s why, intuitively, he deserves our pity more than our moral
condemnation.
4
The story of Mr. Puppet raises an important question:  What is the
difference between Mr. Puppet and anyone else accused of a crime?  After all,
we have little reason to doubt that (a) the state of the universe 10,000 years ago,
(b) the laws of physics, and (c) the outcomes of random quantum mechanical
events are together sufficient to determine everything that happens nowadays,
including our own actions.  And these things are all clearly beyond our control.
                                                   
4 This is not to say that we could not describe Mr. Puppet in such a way that our intuitions about
him would change.  Our point is only that, when the details are laid bare, it is very hard to see him
as morally responsible.27
So what’s the real difference between us and Mr. Puppet?  One obvious
difference is that Mr. Puppet is the victim of a diabolical plot while most people,
we presume, are not.  But does this matter?  The thought that Mr. Puppet is not
fully responsible depends on the idea that his actions were externally
determined.  Forces beyond his control constrained his personality to the point
that it was “no surprise” that he would behave badly.  But the fact that these
forces are connected to the desires and intentions of evil scientists is really
irrelevant, is it not?  What matters is only that these forces are beyond Mr.
Puppet’s control, that they’re not really his.  The fact that someone could
deliberately harness these forces to reliably design criminals is an indication of
the strength of these forces, but the fact that these forces are being guided by
other minds rather than simply operating on their own seems irrelevant, so far as
Mr. Puppet’s freedom and responsibility are concerned.
Thus, it seems that, in a very real sense, we’re all puppets.  The combined
effects of genes and environment determine all of our actions.  Mr. Puppet is
exceptional only in that the inentions of other humans lie behind his genes and
environment.  But, so long as his genes and environment are intrinsically
comparable to those of ordinary people, this doesn’t really matter.  We are no
more free than he is.
What all of this illustrates is that the “fundamental psycholegal error” is
grounded in a powerful moral intuition that the law and allied compatibilist
philosophies try to sweep under the rug.  The foregoing suggests that people28
only regard actions as fully free when those actions are seen as robust against
determination by external forces.  But if determinism (or determinism plus
quantum mechanics) is true, then no actions are truly free because forces
beyond our control are always sufficient to determine behaviour.  Thus, intuitive
free will is libertarian, not compatibilist.  That is, it requires the rejection of
determinism and an implicit commitment to some kind of magical mental
causation.
5
Naturalistic philosophers and scientists have known for a long time that
magical mental causation is a non-starter.  But this realization is the result of
philosophical reflection about the nature of the universe and its governance by
physical law.  Philosophical reflection, however, is not the only way to see the
problems with libertarian accounts of free will.  Indeed, we argue that
neuroscience can help people appreciate the mechanical nature of human action
in a way that bypasses complicated arguments.
                                                   
5 Compatibilist philosophers such as Daniel Dennett (Dennett, 2003) might object that the story of
Mr. Puppet is nothing but a misleading “intuition pump.”  Indeed, this is what Dennett says about
a similar case of Alfred Mele’s (Mele, 1995).  We believe that our case is importantly different
from Mele’s. Dennett/Mele imagine two women who are psychologically identical:  Ann is a typical
good person, while Beth has been brainwashed to be just like Ann.  Dennett argues, against
Mele, that if you take seriously the claim that these two are psychologically identical and properly
imagine that Beth is as rational, open-minded, etc. as Ann, you’ll come to see that the two are
equally free.  We agree with Dennett that Ann and Beth are comparable and that Mele’s intuition
falters when the details are fleshed out.  But does the same hold for the intuition provoked by Mr.
Puppet’s story?  It seems to us that the more one knows about Mr. Puppet and his life the less
inclined one is to see him as truly responsible for his actions and our punishing him as a worthy
end in itself.  We can agree with Dennett that there is a sense in which Mr. Puppet is free.  Our
point is merely that there is a legitimate sense in which he, like all of us, is not free and that this
sense matters for the law.29
5. Neuroscience and the transparent bottleneck
We have argued that, contrary to legal and philosophical orthodoxy, determinism
really does threaten free will and responsibility as we intuitively understand them.
It’s just that most of us, including most philosophers and legal theorists, have yet
to appreciate it.  This controversial opinion amounts to an empirical prediction
that may or may not hold:  As more and more scientific facts come in, providing
increasingly vivid illustrations of what the human mind is really like, more and
more people will develop moral intuitions that are at odds with our current social
practices.  (See Robert Wright (Wright, 1994) for similar thoughts.)
Neuroscience has a special role to play in this process for the following
reason.  As long as the mind remains a black box, there will always be a donkey
on which to pin dualist and libertarian intuitions.  For a long time, philosophical
arguments have persuaded some people that human action has purely
mechanical causes, but not everyone cares for philosophical arguments.
Arguments are nice, but physical demonstrations are far more compelling.  What
neuroscience does, and will continue to do at an accelerated pace, is elucidate
the “when,” “where,” and “how” of the mechanical processes that cause
behaviour.  It’s one thing to deny that human decision-making is purely
mechanical when your opponent offers only a general, philosophical argument.
It’s quite another to hold your ground when your opponent can make detailed
predictions concerning how these mechanical processes work, complete with30
images of the brain structures involved and equations that describe their function.
6
Thus, neuroscience holds the promise of turning the black box of the mind
into a transparent bottleneck.  There are many causes that impinge on
behaviour, but all of them—from the genes you inherited, to the pain in your
lower back, to the advice your grandmother gave you when you were six—must
exert their influence through the brain.  Thus, your brain serves as a bottleneck
for all the forces spread throughout the universe of your past that affect who you
are and what you do.  Moreover, this bottleneck contains the events that are,
intuitively, most critical for moral and legal responsibility, and we may soon be
able to observe them closely.
At some time in the future we may have extremely high-resolution
scanners that can simultaneously track the neural activity and connectivity of
every neuron in a human brain, along with computers and software that can
analyze and organize these data.  Imagine, for example, watching a film of your
brain choosing between soup and salad.  The analysis software highlights the
neurons pushing for soup in red and the neurons pushing for salad in blue.  You
zoom in and slow down the film, allowing yourself to trace the cause-and-effect
relationships between individual neurons—the mind’s clockwork revealed in
arbitrary detail.  You find the tipping-point moment at which the blue neurons in
                                                   
6 We do not wish to imply that neuroscience will inevitably put us in a position to predict any given
action based on a neurological examination.  Rather, our suggestion is simply that neuroscience
will eventually advance to the point at which the mechanistic nature of human decision-making is
sufficiently apparent to undermine the force of dualist/libertarian intuitions.  See below.31
your prefrontal cortex out-fire the red neurons, seizing control of your pre-motor
cortex and causing you to say, “I’ll have the salad, please.”
At some further point this sort of brainware may be very widespread, with
a high res. brain scanner in every classroom.  People may grow up completely
used to the idea that every decision is a thoroughly mechanical process, the
outcome of which is completely determined by the results of prior mechanical
processes.  What will such people think as they sit in their jury boxes?  Suppose
a man has killed his wife in a jealous rage.  Will jurors of the future wonder
whether the defendant acted in that moment of his own free will?  Will they
wonder if it was really him who killed his wife rather than his uncontrollable
anger?  Will they ask whether he could have done otherwise?  Whether he really
deserves to be punished, or if he’s just a victim of unfortunate circumstances?
We submit that these questions, which seem so important today, will lose their
grip in an age when the mechanical nature of human decision-making is fully
appreciated.  The law will continue to punish misdeeds, as it must for practical
reasons, but the idea of distinguishing the truly, deeply guilty from those who are
merely victims of neuronal circumstances will, we submit, seem pointless.
At least in our more reflective moments.  Our intuitive sense of free will
runs quite deep, and it’s possible that we will never be able to fully talk ourselves
out of it.  Next we consider the psychological origins of the problem of free will.32
6. Folk psychology and folk physics collide: a cognitive account of the
problem of attributive free will
Could the problem of free will just melt away?  This question begs another:  Why
do we have the problem of free will in the first place?  Why does the idea of a
deterministic universe seem to contradict something important in our conception
of human action?  A promising answer to this question is offered by Daniel
Wegner in The Illusion of Conscious Will (Wegner, 2002).  In short, Wegner
argues, we feel as if we are uncaused causers, and therefore granted a degree
of independence from the deterministic flow of the universe, because we are
unaware of the deterministic processes that operate in our own heads.  Our
actions appear to be caused by our mental states, but not by physical states of
our brains, and so we imagine that we are metaphysically special, that we are
non-physical causes of physical events. This belief in our specialness is likely to
meet the same fate as other similarly narcissistic beliefs that we have cherished
in our past:  that the Earth lies at the center of the universe, that humans are
unrelated to other species, that all of our behavior is consciously determined, etc.
Each of these beliefs has been replaced by a scientific, and humbling
understanding of our place in the physical universe, and there is no reason to
believe that the case will be any different for our sense of free will.  (For similar
thoughts, see Wright (Wright, 1994) on Darwin’s clandestine views regarding free
will and responsibility.)33
We believe that Wegner’s account of the problem of free will is essentially
correct, although we disagree strongly with his conclusions concerning its (lack
of) practical, moral implications (see below).  In this section we pick up on and
extend one strand in Wegner’s argument (Pp. 15-28).  Wegner’s primary aim is
to explain, in psychological terms, why we attribute free will to ourselves, why we
feel free from the inside.  Our aim in this section is to explain, in psychological
terms, why we insist on attributing free will to others—and why scientifically
minded philosophers, despite persistent efforts, have managed to talk almost no
one out of this practice.  The findings we review serve as an examples of how
psychological and neuroscientific data are beginning to characterize the
mechanisms that underlie our sense of free will, how these mechanisms can lead
us to assume free will is operating when it is not, and how a scientific
understanding of these mechanisms can serve to dismantle our commitment to
the idea of free will.
Looking out at the world, it appears to contain two fundamentally different
kinds of entities.  On the one hand, there are ordinary objects that appear to obey
the ordinary laws of physics, things like rocks and puddles of water and blocks of
wood.  These things don’t get up and move around on their own.  They are, in a
word, inanimate.  On the other hand, there are things that seem to operate by
some kind of magic.  Humans and other animals, so long as they are alive, can
move about at will, in apparent defiance of the physical laws that govern ordinary
matter.  Because things like rocks and puddles, on the one hand, and mice and34
humans, on the other, behave in such radically different ways, it makes sense,
from an evolutionary perspective, that creatures would evolve separate cognitive
systems for processing information about each of these classes of objects
(Pinker, 1997).  There is a good deal of evidence to suggest that this is precisely
how our minds work.
A line of research beginning with Fritz Heider illustrates this point. Heider
and Simmel (Heider and Simmel, 1944) created a movie involving three simple
geometric shapes that move about in various ways.  For example, a big triangle
chases a little circle around the screen, bumping into it. The little circle repeatedly
moves away, and a little triangle repeatedly moves in between the circle and the
big triangle.  When normal people watch this movie they cannot help but view it
in social terms (Heberlein and Adolphs, 2004).  They see the big triangle as
trying to harm the little circle, and the little triangle as trying to protect the little
circle; and they see the little circle as afraid and the big triangle as frustrated.
Some people even spontaneously report that the big triangle is a bully.  In other
words, simple patterns of movement trigger in people’s minds a cascade of
complex social inferences.  People not only see these shapes as “alive.”  They
see beliefs, desires, intentions, emotions, personality traits, and even moral
blameworthiness.  And it appears that this kind of inference is automatic (Scholl
and Tremoulet, 2000).  Of course, you, the observer, know that it’s only a film,
and a very simple one at that, but you nevertheless can’t help but see these
events in social, even moral, terms.35
That is, unless you have damage to your amygdala, a subcortical brain
structure that is important for social cognition (Adolphs, 1999).  Andrea Heberlein
tested a patient with rare bilateral amygdala damage using Heider’s movie and
found that this patient, unlike normal people, described what she saw in
completely asocial terms, despite that fact that her visual and verbal abilities are
not compromised by her brain damage.  Somehow, this patient is blind to the
“human” drama that normal people can’t help but see in these events (Heberlein
and Adolphs, 2004).
The sort of thinking that kicks in when normal people view the Heider-
Simmel film is sometimes known as “folk psychology” (Fodor, 1987), “the
intentional stance” (Dennett, 1987), or “theory of mind,” (Premack and Woodruff,
1978).  There is a fair amount of evidence (including the work described above)
suggesting that humans have a set of cognitive subsystems that are specialized
for processing information about intentional agents (Saxe et al., 2004).  At the
same time, there is evidence to suggest that humans and other animals also
have subsystems specialized for “folk physics,” an intuitive sense of how ordinary
matter behaves.  One nice piece of evidence for the claim that normal humans
have subsystems specialized for folk physics comes from studies of people with
Autism spectrum disorder.  These individuals are particularly bad at solving
problems that require “folk psychology,” but they do very well with problems
related to how physical objects (e.g. the parts of machine) behave, i.e. “folk
physics” (Baron Cohen, 2000).  Another piece of evidence for a “folk physics”36
system comes from discrepancies between people’s physical intuitions and the
way the world actually works.  People say, for example, that a ball shot out of a
curved tube resting on a flat surface will continue to follow a curved path outside
the tube when in fact it will follow a straight path (McCloskey et al., 1980).  The
fact that people’s physical intuitions are slightly, but systematically, out of step
with reality suggests that the mind brings a fair amount of implicit theory to the
perception of physical objects.
Thus, it’s at least plausible that we possess distinguishable cognitive
systems for making sense of the behaviour of objects in the world.  These
systems seem to have two fundamentally different “ontologies.”  The folk physics
system deals with chunks of matter that move around without purposes of their
own according to the laws of intuitive physics, while the folk psychology system
deals with unseen features of minds: beliefs, desires, intentions, etc.  But what,
to our minds, is a mind?  We suggest that a crucial feature, if not the defining
feature, of a mind (intuitively understood) is that it’s an uncaused causer (Scholl
and Tremoulet, 2000).  Minds animate material bodies, allowing them to move
without any apparent physical cause and in pursuit of goals.  Moreover, we
reserve certain social attitudes for things that have minds.  For example, we don’t
resent the rain for ruining our picnic, but we would resent a person who hosed
our picnic (Strawson, 1962).  And we resent picnic-hosers considerably more
when we perceive that their actions are intentional.  Thus, it seems that folk
psychology is the gateway to moral evaluation.  To see something as morally37
blameworthy or praiseworthy (even if it’s just a moving square), one has to first
see it as “someone,” that is, as having a mind.
With all of this in the background, one can see how the problem of
attributive free will arises.  To see something as a responsible moral agent, one
must first see it as having a mind.  But, intuitively, a mind is, among other things,
an uncaused causer.  Consequently, when something is seen as a mere physical
entity operating in accordance with deterministic physical laws, it ceases to be
seen, intuitively, as a mind.  Consequently, it is seen as an object unworthy of
moral praise or blame.  (Note that we are not claiming that people automatically
attribute moral agency to anything that appears to be an uncasued casuer.
Rather, our claim is that seeing something as an uncasued causer is a necessary
but not sufficient condition for seeing something as a moral agent.)
After thousands of years of our thinking of one another as uncaused
causers, science comes along and tells us that there is no such thing—that all
causes, with the possible exception of the Big Bang, are caused causes
(determinism).  This creates a problem.  When we look at people as physical
systems, we can’t see them as any more blameworthy or praiseworthy than
bricks.  But when we perceive people via our intuitive, folk-psychology we can’t
avoid attributing moral blame and praise.
And so, philosophers who would honor both our scientific knowledge and
our social instincts try to reconcile these two competing outlooks.  But the result
is never completely satisfying, and the debate wears on.  Philosophers who can’t38
let go of the idea of uncaused causes defend libertarianism, and thus opt for
scientifically dubious, “panicky metaphysics.”  Hard determinists, in contrast,
embrace the conclusions of modern science, and concede what others will not:
that many of our dearly held social practices are based on an illusion.  The
remaining majority, the compatibilists, try to talk themselves into a compromise.
But the compromise is fragile.  When the physical details of human action are
made vivid, folk psychology loses its grip, just as folk physics loses its grip when
the morally significant details are emphasized.  The problem of free will and
determinism will never find an intuitively satisfying solution because it arises out
of a conflict between two distinct cognitive subsystems that speak different
cognitive “languages” and that may ultimately be incapable of negotiation.
7. Free will, responsibility, and consequentialism
Even if there is no intuitively satisfying solution to the problem of free will, it
doesn’t follow that there is no correct view of the matter.  Ours is as follows:
When it comes to the issue of free will itself, hard determinism is mostly correct.
Free will, as we ordinarily understand it, is an illusion.  However, it does not
follow from the fact that free will is an illusion that there is no legitimate place for
responsibility.  Recall from Section 1 that there are two general justifications for
holding people legally responsible for their actions.  The retributive justification,39
by which the goal of punishment is to give people what they really deserve, does
depend on this dubious notion of free will.  However, the consequentialist
approach doesn’t require a belief in free will at all.  As consequentialists, we can
hold people responsible for crimes simply because doing so has, on balance,
beneficial effects through deterrence, containment, etc.  It is sometimes said that
if we don’t believe in free will then we can’t legitimately punish anyone and that
society must dissolve into anarchy.  In a less hysterical vein, Daniel Wegner
argues that free will, while illusory, is a necessary fiction for the maintenance of
our social structure (Wegner, 2002, Ch. 9).  We disagree.  There are perfectly
good, forward-looking justifications for punishing criminals that do not depend on
metaphysical fictions.  (Wegner’s observations may apply best to the personal
sphere.  See below.)
The vindication of responsibility in the absence of free will means that
there is more than a grain of truth in compatibilism.  The consequentialist
approach to responsibility generates a derivative notion of free will that we can
embrace (Smart, 1961).  In the name of producing better consequences, we will
want to make a number of distinctions among various actions and agents.  To
begin, we will want to distinguish the various classes of people who cannot be
deterred by the law from those who can.  That is, we will recognize many of the
“diminished capacity” excuses that the law currently recognizes such as infancy
and insanity.  We will also recognize familiar justifications such those associated
with crimes committed under duress (e.g. threat of death).  If we like, then, we40
can say that the actions of rational people operating free from duress, etc., are
free actions, and that such people are exercising their free will.
At this point, compatibilists such as Daniel Dennett may claim victory:
“What more could one want from free will?”  In a word:  retributivism.  We have
argued that commonsense retributivism really does depend on a notion of free
will that is scientifically suspect.  Intuitively, we want to punish those people who
truly deserve it, but whenever the causes of someone’s bad behavior are made
sufficiently vivid, we no longer see that person as truly deserving of punishment.
This insight is expressed by the old French proverb: “To know all is to forgive all.”
It is also expressed in the teachings of religious figures, such as Jesus and
Buddha, who preach a message of universal compassion.  Neuroscience can
make this message more compelling by vividly illustrating the mechanical nature
of human action.
Our penal system is highly counter-productive from a consequentialist
perspective, especially in the United States, and yet it remains in place because
retributivist principles have a powerful moral and political appeal (Lacey, 1988;
Tonry, 2004).  It is possible, however, that neuroscience will change these moral
intuitions by undermining the intuitive, libertarian conceptions of free will on which
retributivism depends.
As advocates of consequentialist legal reform, it behooves us to briefly
respond to the three standard criticisms levied against consequentialist theories
of punishment.  First, it is claimed that consequentialism would justify extreme41
over-punishing.  As noted above, it’s possible in principle that the goal of
deterrence would justify punishing parking violations with the death penalty or
framing innocent people in order to make examples of them.  Here the standard
response is adequate.  The idea that such practices could, in the real world,
make society happier on balance is absurd.  Second, it is claimed that
consequentialism justifies extreme under-punishment.  In response to some
versions of this objection, our response is the same as above.  Deceptive
practices such as a policy of faking punishment cannot survive in a free society,
and a free society is required for the pursuit of most consequentialist ends.  In
other cases consequentialism may advocate more lenient punishments for
people who, intuitively, deserve worse.  Here we maintain that a deeper
understanding of human action and human nature will lead people—more of
them, at any rate—to abandon these retributivist intuitions.  Our response is
much the same to the third and most general criticism of consequentialist
punishment, which is that even when consequentialism gets the punishment
policy right, it does so for the wrong reasons.  These supposedly right reasons
are reasons that we reject, however intuitive and natural they may feel.  They
are, we maintain, grounded in a metaphysical view of human action that is
scientifically dubious and therefore an unfit basis for public policy in a pluralistic
society.
Finally, as defenders of hard determinism and a consequentialist
approach to responsibility, we should briefly address some standard concerns42
about the rejection of free will and conceptions of responsibility that depend on it.
First, doesn’t the fact that you can raise your hand “at will” prove that free will is
real?  Not in the sense that matters.  As Daniel Wegner (Wegner, 2002) has
argued, our first-person sense of ourselves as having free will may be a
systematic illusion.  And from a third-person perspective, we simply don’t assume
that anyone who exhibits voluntary control over his body is free in the relevant
sense, as in the case of Mr. Puppet.
A more serious challenge is the claim that our commitments to free will
and retributivism are simply inescapable for all practical purposes.  With respect
to free will, one might wonder whether one can so much as make a decision
without implicitly assuming that one is free to choose among one’s apparent
options.  With respect to responsibility and punishment, one might wonder if it is
humanly possible to deny our retributive impulses (Strawson, 1962; Pettit, 2002).
This challenge is bolstered by recent work in the behavioral sciences suggesting
that an intuitive sense of fairness runs deep in our primate lineage (Brosnan and
De Waal, 2003) and that an adaptive tendency toward retributive punishment
may have been a crucial development in the biological and cultural evolution of
human sociality (Fehr and Gachter, 2002; Boyd et al., 2003; Bowles and Gintis,
2004). Recent neuroscientific findings have added further support to this view,
suggesting that the impulse to exact punishment may be driven by
phylogentically old mechanisms in the brain (Sanfey et al., 2003). These
mechanisms may be an efficient , and perhaps essential, device for maintaining43
social stability.    If retributivism runs that deep and is that useful, one might
wonder whether we have any serious hope of, or reason for, getting rid of it.
Have we any real choice but to see one another as free agents who deserve to
be rewarded and punished for our past behaviors?
We offer the following analogy:  Modern physics tells us that space is
curved.  Nevertheless, it may be impossible for us to see the world as anything
other than flatly Euclidean in our day-to-day lives.  And there are, no doubt, deep
evolutionary explanations for our Euclidean tendencies.   Does it then follow that
we are forever bound by our innate Euclidean psychology?  The answer depends
on the domain of life in question.  In navigating the aisles of the grocery store, an
intuitive, Euclidean representation of space is not only adequate, but probably
inevitable.  However, when we are, for example, planning the launch of a
spacecraft, we can and should make use of relativistic physical principles that are
less intuitive but more accurate.  In other words, a Euclidean perspective is not
necessary for all practical purposes, and the same may be true for our implicit
commitment to free will and retributivism.  For most day-to-day purposes it may
be pointless or impossible to view ourselves or others in this detached sort of
way.  But—and this is the crucial point—it may not be pointless or impossible to
adopt this perspective when one is deciding what the criminal law should be or
whether a given defendant should be put to death for his crimes.  These may be
special situations, analogous to those routinely encountered by “rocket44
scientists,” in which the counter-intuitive truth that we legitimately ignore most of
the time can and should be acknowledged.
  Finally, there is the worry that to reject free will is to render all of life
pointless:  Why would you bother with anything if it’s all long since been
determined?  The answer is that you’ll bother because you’re a human, and
that’s what humans do.  Even if you decide, as part of a little intellectual exercise,
that you’re going to sit around and do nothing because you’ve concluded that you
have no free will, you’re eventually going to get up and make yourself a
sandwich.  And if you don’t, you’ve got bigger problems than philosophy can fix.
8. Conclusion
Neuroscience is unlikely to tell us anything that will challenge the law’s stated
assumptions.  However, we maintain that advances in neuroscience are likely to
change the way people think about human action and criminal responsibility by
vividly illustrating lessons that some people appreciated long ago.  Free will as
we ordinarily understand it is an illusion generated by our cognitive architecture.
Retributivist notions of criminal responsibility ultimately depend on this illusion,
and, if we are lucky, they will give way to consequentialist ones, thus radically
transforming our approach to criminal justice.  At this time, the law deals firmly
but mercifully with individuals whose behaviour is obviously the product of forces45
that are ultimately beyond their control.  Some day, the law may treat all
convicted criminals this way.  That is, humanely.
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